Who is vouching for the input voucher ? decentralized targeting and elite capture in Tanzania by Pan, Lei & Christiaensen, Luc
Policy Research Working Paper 5651
Who Is Vouching for the Input Voucher?




East Asia and Pacific Region


















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5651
Input subsidy programs carry support as instruments 
to increase agricultural productivity, provided they are 
market-smart.  This requires especially proper targeting 
to contain the fiscal pressure, with decentralized targeting 
of input vouchers currently the instrument of choice. 
Nonetheless, despite clear advantages in administrative 
costs, the fear of elite capture persists.  These fears are 
borne out in the experience from the 2008 input voucher 
pilot program in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, examined here. 
Elected village officials received about 60 percent of the 
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distributed vouchers, a factor that significantly reduced 
the targeting performance of the program, especially in 
more unequal and remote communities. When targeting 
the poor, greater coverage and a focus on high trust 
settings helped mitigate these concerns. The findings 
highlight the continuing need for scrutiny when relying 
on decentralized targeting. A clearer sense of purpose 
(increasing productivity among poorer farmers versus 
increasing aggregate output) could also enhance the 
targeting performance.  
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1  The Challenge of Targeting  
Following the widely acclaimed success of Malawi’s large scale agricultural input 
subsidy program,
2 input subsidies are now also endorsed by the donor community as a way to 
boost smallholder productivity, provided the programs are ―market-smart‖ (World Bank, 
2007; Dorward, 2009).  Market-smart input subsidies are part of a broader productivity 
enhancement program, have clear exit strategies, and most importantly, they are carefully 
targeted at overcoming market failures.
3  Especially credit and insurance markets are often 
absent or incomplete, but input markets may also need an initial (demand) push to help input 
providers overcome high initial distribution costs and achieve economies of scale.     
There are many ways to target transfers (Coady, Grosh, Hoddinott, 2004).  When it 
comes to targeting input subsidies, it is the decentralized distribution of input vouchers that 
has become the vehicle of choice.  Vouchers entitle farmers to buy modern inputs (usually 
fertilizer and improved seeds) from participating input retailers at a subsidized price. 
Distribution of the vouchers to the beneficiary farming households is delegated to different 
levels of government, whereby geographic targeting—the selection of districts and villages 
within districts based on their agro-ecological potential—is often combined with community 
based targeting—the selection of beneficiaries within the village by the community.  
Decentralized targeting is also frequently applied in anti-poverty interventions and 
safety net programs (Grosh, del Ninno, Tesliuc, and Ouerghi, 2008).  It seeks to exploit the 
privileged knowledge local governments and communities have about the conditions of the 
beneficiaries to reduce the administrative cost of targeting.  It assumes that local leadership is 
                                                 
2 See Dorward and Chirwa (2011) for a comprehensive review. 
3 Universal input subsidies, popular from the mid 70s to the early 90s, have not only proven to be fiscally 
unsustainable, larger farmers, who usually already have the know how and finance to use and purchase inputs, 
do not need them to adopt modern inputs.  Subsidizing them would likely only outcrowd demand for 
commercial fertilizer (Rickert-Gilbert, Jayne, and Chirwa, 2011) and come at a particularly high opportunity 
cost, including investments in public goods such as research and development and rural infrastructure. 3 
 
more likely to act in the interest of the beneficiaries than central governments, as local leaders 
are likely to be held more accountable by their local constituencies, who have difficulties 
monitoring a distant central government. 
Nonetheless, elite capture of the benefits of poverty programs remains a real concern 
and the empirical evidence so far has been mixed (Mansuri and Rao, 2004).  Alderman (2002) 
and Faguet (2004) report that decentralization of development programs improved the 
targeting toward the poor in Albania and Bolivia respectively, while in Bangladesh’s 
decentralized Food-for-Education Program, within village allocation of funds appears more 
pro-poor than allocation across villages (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005). Park and Wang (2010) 
on the other hand find that China’s community based development program—its flagship 
poverty alleviation program—only increased the incomes of the better off in each village, and 
not these of the poor and Platteau (2004) shows that the local elite took control of social fund 
expenditures in West Africa.   
Several factors have been advanced to explain the likelihood of elite capture in 
different contexts, including political factors such as the local power structure (Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2006) and levels of awareness (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000), economic 
factors such as income level and poverty (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005), social factors such 
as community homogeneity (Seabright, 1996) as well as design features of the program such 
as the size of the program (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005), the official eligibility criteria and 
whether the program concerns distribution of public or private goods (Araujo et al., 2008).  
Yet, no clear-cut insights have emerged so far about the conditions under which decentralized 
targeting is likely to be more successful. 
Clearly, the popularity of decentralized targeting of input vouchers contrasts with the 
continuing concerns about elite capture reported in the literature and the poor understanding 
of the conditions under which it is likely to work better. Whether these concerns are also 4 
 
valid when targeting input vouchers, and if so, under which conditions, is an important 
empirical question for the input voucher debate as well as for the decentralized targeting 
literature more broadly, which has so far featured few studies from African settings and has 
largely focused on studying targeting performance with respect to reaching the poor.  This 
study contributes to filling this void and empirically examines the targeting performance of 
the input voucher program introduced in Kilimanjaro by the Government of Tanzania in the 
2008/9 farming season.   
As Wiggins and Brooks (2010) highlight, input voucher programs (implicitly or 
explicitly) often pursue a dual objective—boosting aggregate output and raising incomes 
among poor smallholders.
4  To increase agricultural productivity among poor smallholders 
input vouchers should be aimed at poorer farmers who are most likely to meet market failures 
in the credit and insurance markets (Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011).  However, to boost 
aggregate output vouchers should be directed to farmers with the highest marginal 
productivity.  Both groups do not necessarily coincide and the performance of community 
based targeting may well depend on the yardstick used. If so, this would bring an important 
additional insight to the broader literature on decentralized targeting.  Elite capture may for 
example deteriorate the targeting performance of community based targeting if poverty is the 
criterion, but not necessarily so when marginal productivity is the yardstick.   
Overall, in this study, elected village officials, who can be seen as members of the 
local elites, receive about 60 percent of the distributed vouchers and multivariate analysis 
confirms that being a member of the local elite, significantly increases the likelihood of 
receiving a voucher. Follow up analysis of the targeting performance, shows that local elite 
                                                 
4 The former can also finds its justification in a market failure, i.e. the failure by the individual to capture the 
economy wide effects of lower food prices. If implemented at a sufficiently large scale, input subsidies can 
substantially increase production. Where staples are non-tradable, this can reduce staple crop prices and induce 
another round of income growth off the farm, given strong linkage effects through back and forward linkages 
(Haggblade, Reardon, and Dorosh, 2007). Such linkage effects have been documented to be still important in 
Africa (Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil, 2009). 5 
 
capture substantially reduces the targeting performance of the program, irrespective of the 
targeting criterion used (poverty, marginal productivity or induction of new input users). This 
lends credence to the lingering concerns in the literature on decentralized targeting about elite 
capture and its negative effects on targeting performance. These tendencies of elite capture 
are more pronounced in more unequal and remote communities, while program coverage, as 
well as trust levels in the village, emerge as important counteracting factors, at least when 
poverty is the targeting criterion.  Overall, the voucher distribution in this study is not 
fundamentally different from what would have been observed under random/uniform 
distribution, highlighting the continuing need for scrutiny and selectivity when relying on 
decentralized targeting in practice.  Larger singularity in objective could further help in 
making input subsidies also market smart on the ground.   
The paper proceeds in section 2 by describing how input vouchers are distributed in 
principle and practice in Tanzania and our sample study, and by characterizing who is more 
or less likely to receive them. Section 3 begins by introducing the metric to analyze targeting 
performance, followed by an analysis of the key factors correlated with this performance. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2  Distribution in Practice 
The Input Voucher Program in Tanzania 
 
Following the 2007/8 food crisis, the Government of Tanzania launched an input 
voucher pilot program in 56 districts to increase the production of two of its major staple 
crops—maize and rice—and enhance its national food security.   The program was 
geographically targeted to areas most suitable for maize and paddy rice production, while 
also taking into account the number of agricultural households who cultivated less than one 
hectare of maize or rice. As food prices remained high and volatile in the aftermath of the 6 
 
crisis, the program was expanded in 2009 to 65 districts to reach 2.5 million households in 
2012 (World Bank, 2009). The target areas are concentrated in the Southern Highlands, the 
Northern Highlands, and the Western Region and focused on agro-ecological zones suitable 
for the target crops.  
The input package distributed consisted originally of three vouchers: 1) one for two 
bags of urea, 2) one for one bag of Di-ammonium Phosphates (DAP) or two bags of Minjingu 
Rock Phosphate (MRP) with nitrogen supplement, and 3) one for 10 kilograms of hybrid or 
open-pollinated maize seeds or 16 kilograms of rice seeds, sufficient for half a hectare of 
maize or rice. Vouchers for each input had a face value equivalent to 50 percent of the market 
price of the respective input. The remaining 50 percent was to be paid by the farmers.
5  
The central government allocates the vouchers to the target regions,
6 taking into 
consideration the total area of maize and rice under cultivation, the regional maize and rice 
output as well as the soil and rainfall patterns.  To distribute the vouchers further voucher 
committees were established in the seat of the different local government councils.
7   The 
Regional Voucher Committees estimate the demand for inputs using historical production data 
and allocate the vouchers to the districts.  The District Voucher Committees (DVC) are 
responsible for the distribution of the vouchers to the villages. They collect and review 
information about their maize and rice production, their input use, and other related information. 
Vouchers are then allocated to the selected villages based on the number of farmers who grow 
maize and rice and the average land size per farmer.  The village council, in consultation with the 
village assembly, organizes the election of the Village Voucher Committee (VVC), which draws 
up a list of beneficiary farmers for approval by the village assembly.
8  After approval, the VVC 
                                                 
5 Co-financing posed a problem at times and since 2009/2010, the voucher for urea was reduced to one bag. 
6 In addition to the central government, there are four levels of local government: regions, districts, wards and 
villages.  
7 See Mniwasa and Shauri (2001) for more details on the government structure in Tanzania. 
8 The village assembly consists of all persons aged 18 and above, while the village council comprises of 15 to 25 
members elected by the village assembly.  The council consists of a chairperson, all chairpersons of the sub-7 
 
issues the vouchers to the approved farmers and also monitors the use of inputs by voucher 
recipients. 
The purported objective of the program is dual: 1) increase overall maize and rice 
output, and 2) increase access to modern inputs among poor and vulnerable smallholders. Yet, 
as indicated above, conflicting targeting rules may derive from these dual objectives.  To 
reduce poverty, subsidized inputs should be targeted to the poorer smallholders. If increasing 
aggregate output is the objective, subsidies should be targeted to those with the highest 
marginal input productivity. These often include non-users (Rickert-Gilbert, Jayne, and Black, 
2009), and may or may not coincide with the poorer farmers. 
During the pilot, which forms the basis for our empirical analysis here, the villages 
were advised to target literate farming households willing to use the input vouchers for the 
purported crops and able to meet the co-financing requirement. Application of these criteria 
in most villages would lead to an exclusion of the poorest (those considered unable to co-
finance input purchases). However, the rules were not formally presented and enforced, and 
actual implementation was left to the discretion of the VVC and the village assembly.   
They were however further refined and more formally introduced during the 
expansion of the program in 2009,
9 when it was also formally established that village leaders 
had to be excluded from the VVCs and that the VVCs needed to have equal representation of 
men and women.  The fertilizer voucher was further reduced to one bag of urea to reduce the 
required top up and facilitate participation by poorer farmers. Use of the pilot data thus 
presents an opportunity to analyze how communities identify beneficiaries in less prescribed 
environments, the extent to which the advice was adhered to, and whether the adjustments in 
the targeting rules were well advised.  
                                                                                                                                                        
villages within its area and other members elected by the village assembly.  The term of office for all councillors 
is five years. 
9 One important adjustment was the requirement that the beneficiaries should not be cultivating more than one 
hectare of maize and rice.  8 
 
Voucher Beneficiaries in Kilimanjaro 
The data used here are from the Vulnerability Household Panel conducted in the 
Kilimanjaro region of Tanzania in 2003, 2004 and 2009.
10 Kilimanjaro is a well-connected 
and dynamic coffee growing region located in the Northern Highlands, where maize is an 
important staple (in addition to bananas). It consisted of 5 districts in 2003 (one district was 
split up later on) and the sample was designed to be representative for all agricultural 
households in rural Kilimanjaro.  In the first round, conducted in November-December 2003, 
954 households were surveyed in 45 villages selected using the probability proportional to 
size procedure, or about 21 households per village.  Households were revisited in November-
December 2004 and 2009, with little attrition in 2004 (915 households surveyed), though a 
significant loss of households in 2009 (772 households interviewed).
11  To correct for under-
representation due to attrition of households with certain characteristics, the sampling weights 
of the remaining households were adjusted, as outlined in more detail in Appendix A1. 
Each round the survey comprises a comprehensive community and household survey 
with most of the modules identical across rounds.
12  The data in the third round capture the 
results of the 2008/9 agricultural season, which coincides with the input voucher pilot.  A 
special module about the input voucher was added to the household questionnaire, including 
questions about whether households were determined as eligible, their actual uptake as well 
as the kinds of vouchers received.  The total number of vouchers received by the village was 
recorded in the community survey.  
                                                 
10 See Christiaensen and Sarris (2007) for a detailed description of the survey and sampling design.  
11 Some households with only one elderly were lost due to the death of the person. Some households moved out 
of the village, and some households were not surveyed because they were working far away on their farms.  
12 The community survey collects information about the village governance structure and the demographic, 
geographical, agro-ecological and socio-economic conditions in the village. The household survey provides 
information on household demographic characteristics, including educational status and health, agricultural 
production and sales, non-farm activities and income, consumption, shocks, assets, access to credit and 
perceptions on trust and empowerment. 9 
 
Vouchers were distributed in 39 out of the 45 villages and in each of these villages 
about a quarter of the households received at least one voucher.  To shed a first light on the 
criteria used in practice to identify the beneficiaries, Table 1 divides the sample in three 
groups: 1) those the village determined non-eligible for the input vouchers; 2) those 
determined eligible, but who declined the vouchers; and 3) those determined eligible who 
also took up the voucher. The middle group contains a rather small number of households (18 
households), so the statistics from this group need to be treated with caution.   
To help organize the discussion, the factors posited in the literature to affect eligibility 
are grouped under different headings including 1) politically oriented factors such as being 
(or being associated with) local elite, being informed, feeling empowered; 2) economic 
factors such as efficiency (having high marginal productivity for input use) and equity 
(poverty); 3) social factors such as community homogeneity, trust, gender and ethnicity; 4) 
village characteristics to explore geographic targeting criteria and 5) program design factors 
such as cropping patterns, education levels, and ability to co-finance. Where appropriate (and 
available), information preceding the voucher uptake is used i.e. the value of the indicator 
from the second (2004) as opposed to from the third survey round (2009).  
The table begins by examining the likelihood of eligibility among the local elites (and 
those closely associated with them). Much of the literature on decentralized targeting has 
derived conclusions about elite capture based on indirect evidence inferred from the 
estimated relation between within community inequality and targeting performance (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee, 2005, 2006; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005).
13  Here we explore more directly 
whether certain groups of people, likely to belong to or being associated with the local elites, 
are also more likely to receive the input voucher.  In particular, we look at differences in 
                                                 
13 Another indirect way of inferring the role of elite capture followed by Araujo et al. (2008),  is to compare the 
link between community inequality and the adoption of projects which do and do not benefit the rich. Studying 
social investment fund projects in Ecuador, they find that more unequal communities are less likely to adopt 
projects that provide excludable goods to the poor.  10 
 
eligibility between households with members who 1) hold elected positions in the village
14, 
and 2) have a member in the village voucher committee.  
Looking across the first two rows of Table 1, the likelihood of having received a 
voucher is much larger among households with elected village officials (20 percentage points) 
and among voucher committee members (10 percentage points).  This would suggest that 
being a member of the local elite may indeed affect voucher reception. 
Indeed, while the average proportion of households receiving (at least) one voucher in 
a village is 26 percent, the average proportion of households with an elected household 
member receiving a voucher increases to 35 percent and the average proportion of 
households with a VVC member receiving a voucher increases to 47 percent (figures not 
reported in the table).   On average, 60 percent of all vouchers distributed goes to households 
with elected officials and 16 percent to those who are members of the VVC. Yet, most VVC 
members are also elected officials and together they receive 61 percent of all vouchers. 
Obviously, these are just bi-variate comparisons and they may well reflect other 
associated factors favouring eligibility.  For example, elected officials and members of 
village organizations are usually better ―plugged in‖ in village politics and better informed 
about new initiatives, etc. Indeed, the better informed, i.e. those who access public media 
more frequently and those who interact more frequently with public institutions have a higher 
likelihood of being eligible (by 10 to 15 percentage points), suggesting that awareness 
matters as well.  
 Turning to the dual objective of most input voucher programs (increasing overall 
output and improving poor smallholders’ productivity and income), the second panel looks at 
the targeting performance based on smallholders’ marginal productivity of modern input use  
and based on their (2004) income and poverty status.  The marginal productivities (in value) 
                                                 
14 Elected positions in a village include village chairman, sub-village chairs, 10-cell leaders, members of village 
council and village execution officer. 11 
 
of inorganic fertilizers and seeds are derived for each household from the empirical Cobb-
Douglas production functions estimated with household fixed effects using the 2003 and 
2004 surveys (see Table A2-1 in Appendix A2 for details).
15 The marginal productivities for 
each input are calculated both for total crop production and maize and rice production only. 
Contrary to the optimal targeting rule for increasing aggregate production, vouchers 
are going disproportionately to households with a lower marginal productivity for modern 
input use. The difference is substantial, with the marginal productivity among households that 
receive vouchers 50 to 320 percent lower than among households that are not eligible for 
vouchers.
16  Voucher recipients are also more likely to have used inputs before, i.e. vouchers 
appear not aimed at pulling in non-users, and they also tend to be less poor, with more land. 
In other words, the decentralized targeting does not appear to perform well on either criterion 
for optimal targeting.  
A review of the social factors suggests that male headed households tend to have a 
slight advantage (5 percentage points more likely to receive vouchers).  Similarly, Chagga 
households (who are more prevalent in the richer northern districts) are more likely to receive 
vouchers than Pare households (who are more prevalent in the poorer southern district), 
though there is no discernable difference based on religion. More trusting individuals on the 
other hand, see themselves left with less vouchers (7 percentage points).  Slightly fewer 
vouchers might have been distributed in more remote villages and villages where extension 
agents were present, though none of the differences is statistically significant.  
Finally, consistent with the guidelines, voucher recipients were more educated and 
less likely to be illiterate.  They were also more likely to have planted maize/rice and had 
more land allocated maize/rice cultivation in the past.  As they derived similar shares of 
                                                 
15 The marginal productivities are equal to the exponent of the fitted value in the production function multiplied 
by the coefficient of log of the variable in the household fixed effeccts estimation and divided by the value of 
the variable. 
16 Only when comparing the marginal productivity of improved seeds for maize/rice cultivation is the difference 
not statistically significant. 12 
 
income from non-farm activities, this was however not because they were less engaged in 
off-farm activities. More of the voucher recipients were coffee growers. Recipients were also 
more likely to have the necessary matching funds as suggested by their larger membership in 
financial institutions.  The large need for credit and limited formal membership in financial 
institutions
17 of eligible households who eventually did not take up the voucher suggests that 
access to matching funds has been an issue for some.  
This bi-variate analysis suggests that while targeting on the ground appears in broad 
compliance with the guidelines on paper, the resulting targeting performance is far from 
optimal from an economic perspective. It is not effective at disproportionately reaching the 
poorer farmers, if direct poverty reduction or fostering equity were the target. Nor is it 
effective at disproportionately reaching those with higher marginal productivity, if boosting 
aggregate supply were the target.  In addition, members of the local elite or those closely 
associated with it are receiving a disproportionate share of the vouchers, suggesting that local 
politics may play an independent role.  Disproportionate reception of vouchers by the local 
elite does not automatically follow from the application of the guidelines, but through 
interaction with prevailing community dynamics, it may be well an unintended consequence.   
 
Local Elites and the Voucher Committee Members  
To further explore whether belonging to or being associated with the local elite as 
such affects the reception of a voucher, as suggested by the bi-variate analysis, or whether it 
merely reflects other factors that simultaneously affect eligibility and belonging to the local 
elite, a multi-variate analysis is pursued. In particular, let  
) ( vh v vh vh vh C M H E P V          ,            (1) 
                                                 
17 A SACCO is a Savings and Credit Cooperative. 13 
 
with V a dummy variable indicating whether household h in village v received vouchers, P(.) 
the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution, E a set of variables 
indicating whether a household holds elected office or belongs to the VVC, considered 
proxies for belonging to or being closely associated with the local elite, H a set of household 
characteristics reflecting other political, economic, social and program design factors that are 
considered to affect eligibility and may also affect being part of the local elite (such as 
education), M a set of village dummies that control for village characteristics that may affect 
voucher distribution within village as well as those that may affect voucher distribution 
across villages, C a constant and  the error term.  A positive statistically significant 
coefficient  on E would indicate that local elites are more likely to receive vouchers as such, 
irrespective of the guidelines or whether they are more likely to meet the economic criteria, 
pointing to an independent role in the distribution.  The results from estimating equation (1) 
using probit estimation are in Table 2.  
  Strikingly, after controlling for awareness and empowerment indicators, economic, 
social and program design factors, as well as village characteristics that may affect within 
village distribution, holding elected office, and being a member of the voucher committee, 
are still strongly associated with voucher reception. Ceteris paribus, members of the village 
voucher committee are 22 percent more likely to receive a voucher, and those holding elected 
office 11 percent.   
The economic targeting criteria on the other hand do not appear to be followed, with 
the marginal productivities of fertilizer and seeds on maize/rice not affecting voucher 
reception, while being poor has no effect and income a positive one.  Most of the social 
factors and the program design factors are also not statistically significant or with the wrong 
sign (those with more maize land in the past and more education being more and less likely 
respectively to get vouchers). The other political factors on the other hand (awareness and 14 
 
empowerment) are also highly correlated with voucher reception with those feeling 
empowered to make important decisions being 7 percent more likely and those regularly 
participating in official meetings 10 percent more likely to receive a voucher. 
As village voucher committee members appear to have such a head start in receiving 
vouchers, correlates of being a VVC member are further explored. As before, the probit 
estimator is deployed (Table 2).
18  Elected officials are 7 percentage points more likely to be 
VVC member, giving them an additional edge to be eligible for the voucher (over and above 
their direct advantage).  VVC membership is slightly higher among those participating in the 
meetings and among male headed households.  Finally, Pare households appear slightly 
disadvantaged in being VVC members.  
Clearly, being a VVC member gives an important head start in receiving a voucher. 
Yet, the task of being a VVC member is unfunded, and reception of a voucher is likely seen 
as a form of compensation (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott, 2004).  If this is the case and given 
that they take up 16 percent of the vouchers, the composition of the VVC becomes important.  
From this perspective, the adopted adjustment of the VVC rules to exclude village leaders 
and increase female participation seems warranted, provided their replacements are more 
likely to meet the economic targeting criteria (either being more likely to be poor or being 
more efficient at the margin in using modern inputs).  
In addition, the large independent effect of being (associated with) local elite on 
voucher eligibility suggests a pre-occupation with serving one’s own group first.  And once 
the elected officials have been served, more selectivity may be introduced. This would 
suggest that the more vouchers there are in a village for distribution, the better the targeting 
performance will be.   
                                                 
18 Village level effects were not included this time as in some of the voucher receiving villages there were no 
VVC members in our sample, which would then be automatically dropped from the sample.  15 
 
The bi-variate and multi-variate analyses of voucher eligibility have given a good 
description of who is more likely to receive a voucher and the extent to which this is 
correlated with the targeting criteria either derived from economic theory or those given by 
the guidelines. To enable a more explicit analysis of targeting performance, an explicit 
targeting metric is introduced in the next section, the targeting differential, which is 
subsequently used to explore the different factors that affect the targeting performance across 
and within villages. 
 
3  Targeting Performance  
 
Methodological Considerations 
Following Galasso and Ravallion (2005), three measures of targeting are defined: 
 











12 11          (3) 
where  H is the proportion of all households in the targeted group, s11 is the proportion of all 
households in the targeted group that receive the program, s12 is the proportion of all 
households who are not in the targeted group that receive the program. G
p and G
n therefore 
measure the proportions of households in the targeted group that receive the program and the 
proportion of households not in the targeted group that receive the program respectively. The 
difference between the two measures is the targeting differential, T. 
If the program is perfectly targeted to the ones in the targeted group, the untargeted 
group receives none, and the targeted group is completely covered, then T=1; if the program 
only, but fully, reaches the non-targeted group, then T=-1; a uniform allocation (no targeting) 
implies T=0.  If proportionately more of the targeted than the untargeted group is reached, 
then 1>T>0; if the program reaches proportionately more of the untargeted than the targeted 
group, then 0>T>-1. 16 
 
In addition, Ravallion (2000) shows that the targeting differential at the region level 
can be decomposed into an ―intra-village‖ and an ―inter-village‖ component using the 
following equation:  
  
 
                      (4) 
where h is a household index, v is a village index, and  v N  is the number of households in 
village v.  hv G ,  v G , G is the percentage of households reached by the program in each 
household,
19 village and the region respectively.  hv H ,  v H , H is the percentage of households 
in the targeted group in each household, village and in the region respectively. This 
decomposition enables us to measure which component is dominant in the targeting of the 
program. 
  The relation between village characteristics and the village level targeting differentials 





v v C X T      ,               (5) 
where Tv is the targeting differential at the village level, X is a set of village level political, 
economic, social and program design factors explored in the literature as affecting targeting 
performance (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; 2005; 2006; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; 
Chavis, 2010; Park and Wang; 2010), 
T C is a constant and 
T
v  is the error term. 
 
Rather Limited Targeting after All 
As both equity and efficiency concerns could drive smart input voucher programs, the 
targeting performance of the Kilimanjaro input voucher program is evaluated based on the 
three following criteria: 1) whether the voucher program targets the poor, 2) whether it 
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targets those with high marginal productivity of input use, and 3) whether it reaches 
households that did not use improved seeds and inorganic fertilizers before. The latter 
category is an important target group for market smart subsidies, as it is likely to meet both 
criteria, i.e. being constrained in the financial markets (as reflected in their poverty) and 
displaying high marginal productivity (Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, and Black, 2009).  Potential 
displacement of commercial input purchases, a continuous concern with input subsidies 
(Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne and Chirwa, 2011) is also a non-issue for this latter group, thereby 
increasing additionality of the voucher.  It renders this group particularly attractive from an 
efficiency perspective.   
To analyze the targeting performance based on poverty, two measures of poverty are 
used—the poverty measure calculated in Christiaensen and Pan (2010) and a poverty measure 
using region median consumption per capita level as the poverty line. About half the 
population would be eligible for a voucher each time.
20 For targeting based on efficiency, the 
median values in each village of the households’ marginal productivity of improved seeds 
and fertilizer on maize/rice (as observed in the previous survey round) are used as cut-offs. 
This implies that about half of the population is considered as target population.  The third 
targeted group are the non-users of improved seeds and fertilizers, which made up about 50 
and 67 percent of the households in the previous survey round.
21  
Broadly speaking, and quite strikingly, the targeting differentials hover all around 
zero irrespective of the targeting criterion (first column, Table 3).  This suggests that 
decentralized distribution of the input vouchers does not deviate much from what would have 
been obtained from a random/uniform distribution of these vouchers.  Nonetheless, there are 
some nuances to this overall observation. The targeting performance appears slightly better 
                                                 
20 Note that only 26 percent of all households received (at least) one voucher.  Consequenlty, the targeting 
differential T for the whole sample ranges between [-0.52, 0.52]. 
21 By way of comparison, in 2003, 32% of the households used inorganic fertilizer, in 2004 35% and in 2009 
39%. 18 
 
when considering marginal productivity as criterion, though it is slightly worse when it 
comes to targeting the poor or the non-users, especially non-users of inorganic fertilizers.  
Within village targeting performance based on marginal productivity (the intra village 
targeting differential displaying a positive sign) is slightly better than across village targeting 
(the between village targeting differential being negative).  Yet, both within and across 
villages the targeting differentials are all slightly negative for the other targeting criteria 
(poverty and non-use).  Finally, the substantial standard deviation (around 0.2) in the within 
village targeting differential across villages (Table 3, column 4) suggests substantial 
differences in performance across villages.
22 Table 4 explores the correlates associated with 
these differences in performance. 
 
Elite capture undermines targeting efficiency, but this can be mitigated  
In exploring which correlates affect the within village targeting performance, the 
focus is on a limited set of political, social, program design and service provision factors 
(Table 4).   The choice of these village level correlates was guided by the (limited) literature 
on decentralized targeting reviewed above and deliberately kept to a minimum given the 
relatively small number of villages in the sample. 
 To examine the potential role of elite capture, both the number of vouchers received 
by elected officials and VVC members and the Gini measure of within village (land) 
inequality (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Araujo et al., 2008) are included, further 
complemented with a proxy of awareness (Bardhan and Mookerhjee, 2000; Park and Wang, 
2010), which is usually hypothesized to counteract potential elite capture.  Across villages, 
the number of vouchers received by (sample) households with elected officials and VVC 
                                                 
22 As the targeting differential ranges between -0.52 and 0.52, this implies that some villages are close to perfect 
targeting . 19 
 
members ranges between 0 and 10, with the median situated around 2.4.
23  When expressed 
in terms of shares of vouchers received by elected officials and VVC members, it ranges from 
16 percent for the 10
th percentile village to 100 percent for the 75
th percentile village.
 24 
The within village (land) Gini, which also varies considerably, is included to facilitate 
comparison with the literature, which has often used inequality to reflect power structures. 
Awareness is proxied through the proportion of households regularly using public media.    
This is relatively high, with in each of the sample villages more than half the village 
population (57 percent) consulting public media at least once a month.
25     
Education levels, here proxied by illiteracy levels among household heads, are 
regularly considered in examining targeting performance (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005).  
While illiteracy is generally low (quasi non-existent in almost half the villages), it still 
reaches 42 percent in the most illiterate village.  In a novel addition to the targeting literature, 
the level of trust households in a village have in others is further included as a correlate of 
social cohesion.  The proportion of households in a village who (somewhat or strongly) agree 
that most people can be trusted (arguably a rather demanding measure of trust) ranged 
between zero and 33 percent with the median situated around 17 percent.  Clearly, trust levels 
are higher in some communities than others.  
An important program design feature that has been reported to affect performance is 
the scale of the program (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005).  
This is proxied by the number of (attrition corrected sample) households receiving a voucher, 
which ranges between 1 and 15, with half of the villages receiving more than 4.7 vouchers 
                                                 
23  These have been corrected for potential attrition bias using the inverse of the probability of being selected in 
round 3 (appendix A1).  
24 While the share could also have been used as proxy, the number of vouchers in a village received by elected 
officials and VVC members and the number of vouchers received in a village, which together define the share, 
are introduced separately in the regression, not to constrain their coefficients to be the same.   
25 The degree of participation in meetings and associations was also considered as a proxy for awareness. It was 
not statistically significant in the regression analysis reported in Table 5 and given its correlation with the use of 
public media (ρ=0.26)  and the limited degrees of freedom  it was not retained.   20 
 
and half less. Finally, given the important role of extension agents in the distribution of the 
vouchers, whether there is an extension agent in the village is also controlled for in the 
regression. Extension agents are located in about three quarters of the villages. 
The relation between the intra-village targeting differential and these village level 
factors is estimated for the targeting differentials based on poverty, marginal productivity and 
new input usage (Table 5). As the targeting differential is truncated at -1 and 1, the tobit 
estimator is used.  Clearly, the targeting performance is significantly affected by the number 
of vouchers received by elected officials and VVC members (controlling for the amount of 
vouchers received in the village). In particular, the larger is the number of vouchers going to 
elected village officials and VVC members, the worse is the targeting performance.  In other 
words, not only are elected village officials much more likely to receive vouchers, as 
demonstrated before, this also substantially reduces the targeting performance.  As expected, 
the effects are most detrimental when targeting by poverty—elected village officials tend to 
be less poor. But targeting effectiveness also tends to decline when efficiency is the 
overriding concern, in particular for seeds when targeting based on marginal productivity or 
for fertilizer when aimed at bringing in new users.  At the margin, village elected officials are 
usually not the most efficient input users. 
After controlling for voucher reception by elected officials, no relation is found 
between land inequality and targeting performance, except when it comes to reaching those 
with high marginal productivity for seeds, where it only has a significantly weak, positive 
effect.
26  As will be shown below (Table 6), intra-village inequality is highly correlated with 
the number of vouchers received by elected officials, supporting the notion advanced in the 
literature that intra-village inequality negatively affects the performance of decentralized 
targeting through elite capture.  Contrary to what has been hypothesized in the literature, in 
                                                 
26 There is also no relation between inequality and targeting performance when measuring within village 
inequality based on consumption as opposed to land.  21 
 
this sample, awareness, as proxied through use of public media, does not always results in 
better targeting. Better informed villages appear to be better at targeting vouchers to increase 
marginal efficiency, but also tend to target existing (as opposed to new) users and don’t help 
in disproportionately reaching the poor.    
Both voucher coverage and trust, on the other hand, appear to counteract the negative 
effects of elite capture, when reaching the poor is the criterion.  This holds irrespective of the 
poverty line chosen, with the negative effect of elite capture neutralized when the number of 
vouchers is 28 to 62 percent larger than those received by the elected officials and the VVC, 
according to these estimates.
27  It suggests that the poverty targeting performance can be 
improved given sufficient coverage. However, this does not hold universally when it comes 
to targeting by efficiency or non-use, both important insights for a voucher program design.   
Communities, where trust levels are higher, also tend to be better at reaching the poor 
(Table 5).
28  While no causality is purported here, it is worth highlighting that it is unlikely 
that reverse causality drives this result.  Trust takes long to build, but little to break, not the 
other way round (Williamson, 2000). The trust levels observed are thus unlikely the 
consequence of the experience with the input voucher program only.  With the exception of 
targeting by marginal productivity of seeds, illiteracy levels were not found to affect the 
targeting performance.  
Finally, the targeting performance by efficiency declines in villages where 
agricultural extension agents are present. They seem to be steering vouchers away from 
households with high marginal productivity of fertilizer use and non users of modern inputs, 
maybe guided by the perception that many of the newcomers are ill placed to productively 
                                                 
27 This can be obtained by dividing the coefficients on the number of vouchers received by elected officials by 
the coefficients on the number of vouchers received (i.e.  -0.068/0.053-1=-0.28 or ( -0.078/0.048)-1=0.62, 
depending on the poverty line chose. 
28 The coefficients on the trust variable were not statistically significant in any of the marginal productivity or 
new user regressions and the trust variables were no longer retained as regressors.  22 
 
use such inputs.  This suggests another area for attention in designing future voucher 
programs and their implementation modalities. 
The findings bear out the lingering concerns in the literature about elite capture in 
decentralized targeting, with voucher coverage and allocation in high trust environments 
emerging as counteracting forces when overcoming poverty related market constraints, while 
the presence of extension agents may further exacerbate targeting inefficiencies, when 
increasing volume is the objective. To further see how the political, social and other factors 
indirectly affect targeting performance through the channel of elite capture, the number of 
vouchers received by elected officials and VVC members is regressed directly on these 
factors in Table 6, again using the tobit estimator.  First, elite capture increases with the 
number of vouchers distributed, but at a rate of less than one to one, consistent with the 
earlier observation that voucher coverage can increase targeting performance (at least among 
the poor).  Second, elite capture of the vouchers also increases when intra-village land 
inequality goes up, providing support for the use of within village inequality indicators as 
proxy for elite capture.  Finally, the further away from the rural towns, the more prone the 
local political dynamics are to elite capture.  
 
4  Concluding remarks 
Input subsidy programs have once again become a popular instrument in the policy 
toolbox to increase agricultural productivity across Sub-Saharan Africa. Given that their 
fiscal burden can be high and typically trends upward over time, they only carry broad 
support to the extent that they address market failures, such as credit and insurance market 
failures, and to the extent that they generate multiplier effects by increasing aggregate output 
and reducing staple food prices.  This presumes proper targeting, with decentralized targeting 
of input vouchers currently the preferred tool of choice.  23 
 
Decentralized targeting systems are attractive because they lower the cost of targeting 
by tapping into local knowledge.  Yet, they have also been reported to suffer from elite 
capture.   Using the experience from an input voucher pilot program in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, 
this study examined whether the dangers of elite capture are also real when distributing 
private goods such as input vouchers,  if so, whether elite capture reduces the targeting 
performance of the program, and whether there are mitigating circumstances.  
The results suggest that members of the local elite have indeed a higher likelihood of 
receiving a voucher, partly through their disproportionate membership in the village voucher 
committee, instituted to propose the voucher allocation list within each village. About 45 
percent of the VVC members received a voucher, compared with 34 percent of the elected 
village officials and 26 percent of all villagers. The VVC members and the elected village 
officials received together about 61 percent of the vouchers distributed among the villagers.  
While this ought not to be a problem as such, it was also found that this ―pre-allocation‖ of 
the vouchers to the local elite had a strong negative effect on the targeting performance. 
Analysis of the correlates of intra-village targeting performance and elite capture 
indicated that the occurrence of elite capture was more pronounced in villages with more 
unequal land distributions and in those villages further away from the rural towns.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, villages with extension agents were found to disproportionately steer vouchers 
away from new input users or households with higher marginal productivity in fertilizer use, 
in effect exacerbating the targeting inefficiencies induced by elite capture.  When the focus 
was on fostering production among poor farmers, targeting performance improved when 
coverage increased and the decentralized targeting systems also tended to work better in 
villages where trust levels were higher.   
Together these different factors resulted in a distribution of vouchers that was not 
fundamentally better (if not worse) than what random allocation would have yielded, despite 24 
 
the substantial efforts dispensed by both district and community committees.  This relatively 
poor targeting performance undoubtedly also reflects the program’s simultaneous pursuit of 
multiple objectives (raising aggregate output versus raising poor farmers’ income), which 
each yields different targeting rules (targeting farmers with highest marginal productivity 
versus targeting poor farmers).  This leads to a targeting practice focused on the lowest 
common denominator that tries to serve all in theory, but serves none well in practice.   
 Three core insights emerge for the future design and implementation of input voucher 
programs. First, the findings lend credence to existing concerns about elite capture under 
decentralized targeting schemes, thereby reducing its effectiveness. Second, they suggest that 
these tendencies can be counteracted with enhanced coverage and a greater focus on higher 
trust settings when poorer farmers are targeted, and that greater selectivity and/or scrutiny is 
advised in relying on community based targeting in unequal and remote communities.  In 
addition, extension agents deserve more explicit attention as important factors in influencing 
the program’s targeting performance. Finally, clearer focus in objective could help enhance 
the targeting performance of input voucher programs.  This would also require the 
development of better proxies to target households with high marginal productivity.  While 
there is a longstanding literature on the development of proxy indicators for poverty, it is 
poorly understood which variables would be good at proxying marginal productivity in 
smallholder settings.  25 
 
Appendix A1: Dealing with attrition 
A significant amount of households were lost in the third round of the household 
survey and there are some differences between the interviewed and lost households (Table 
A1-1). For example, households whose fields are further away or who lived in remote 
villages were less likely to be interviewed in round 3. Smaller households are more likely to 
be dropped from the sample. Male headed households and households whose members are 
elected officials or member of a social or economic group are more likely to remain in the 
sample. 
   
Table A1-1:Characteristics of the interviewed and dropped households  
  Attrition round2  Attrition round3 
 
Not 
interviewed  Interviewed 
Not 
interviewed  Interviewed 
Household size (# of persons)  5.010  5.343  4.957  5.410 
Dependency ratio  0.511  0.540  0.542  0.538 
Gender household head (% male)  0.857  0.875  0.791  0.893 
Age household head (year)  47  54  49  54 
Percentage of illiterate household members  0.070  0.070  0.073  0.069 
Member of hh has elected position in village  0.189  0.271  0.166  0.290 
Member of hh is a relative of people with elected positions in 
village  0.083  0.080  0.048  0.088 
Member of hh is a member in a primary society, or other 
economic group  0.116  0.353  0.239  0.365 
Member of hh is a member in a religious, youth, women or other 
social group  0.363  0.374  0.304  0.389 
Time spent on agricultural (month)  5.121  7.553  6.218  7.716 
Time spent on non-farm (month)  0.948  0.627  0.708  0.627 
Maximum distance to land (km)  2  3  2  3 
Land owned (ha)  0.810  0.810  0.607  0.810 
Whether plant maize  0.877  0.830  0.812  0.836 
Whether plant coffee  0.442  0.588  0.435  0.614 
Whether plant beans  0.684  0.671  0.661  0.674 
Whether plant bananas  0.637  0.787  0.629  0.814 
Per adult equivalent household income (1000Tsh)  106  109  105  111 
Value of houses and compound (1000Tsh)  300  1000  600  1000 
Belong to Chagga group  0.568  0.753  0.685  0.758 
Belong to Pare group  0.300  0.172  0.179  0.178 
Christian  0.817  0.875  0.835  0.881 
Distance to town (km)  16  12  16  12 
Village has a market (%)  0.205  0.279  0.282  0.274 
Village can receive cell phone signal (%)  0.662  0.836  0.814  0.831 
Whether there is extension agent in village (%)  0.625  0.627  0.549  0.644 
Village has dispensary, health centre or hospital (%)  0.636  0.517  0.538  0.518 
Note.- Medians of variables maximum distance to land, per adult equivalent household income, value of houses and compound, 
distance to town are reported. Means of all other variables are reported. 26 
 
To correct for such uneven attrition, consider a household which represents N 
households in the region. Its sampling weight is N, usually the inverse of the probability of 
the household being selected into the survey. Now some of the households selected in the 
survey design in the first round were not interviewed in the second and third round. If the 
attrition is random, then no correction is needed. If not, a correction needs to be done. For 
example, if households whose head is old are less likely to be interviewed in the third round 
than households whose head is young, the ratio between households with old head and 
households with young head will decrease from round 1 to round 3. To correct for this bias 
against households with an older head, a higher weight must be given to households with an 
older head in round 3. This is the intuition behind the correction for sample selection bias due 
to attrition followed here (Giles, 2006). 
In particular, if a household interviewed in round 1 has a high probability to be 
interviewed in round 3, its original sampling weight (N) is multiplied by a correction factor to 
lower its weight in round 3
29. If a household interviewed in round 1 has a low probability to 
be interviewed in round 3, its original sampling weight (N) is multiplied by a higher 
correction factor in round 3. The correction factor is defined as the inverse of the probability 
of being interviewed in round 3. 
Table A1-2 shows the results of the Probit regressions used to calculate the 
probabilities. The dependent variables are dummy variables indicating whether the household 
was also interviewed in round 2 or round 3. Even though it was reported during the survey by 
the enumerators that households living far away from their plots were more likely to drop out, 
both the average and the maximum distance to land are not significant in the regressions. The 
age of the household head and household size are important in explaining attrition.  
                                                 
29 No reweighting is needed for round 1 data since all sampled households were interviewed in round 1. 27 
 
Households with only one old person in the first round were more likely to drop out 
from the survey due to death. Big households were less likely to drop out from the survey. 
Female headed households are more likely to drop out in round 3. Village officials’ 
households are more likely to be interviewed in round 2.  
 
Table A1-2: Results of the probit regressions of being interviewed 
  Interviewed 
in round 2 
Interviewed 
in round 3 
Household size (# of persons)  0.056  0.047*   
  (0.044)  (0.025) 
Dependency ratio  0.007  -0.405 
  (0.422)  (0.248) 
Gender of household head  0.105  0.347**  
  (0.233)  (0.145) 
Age of household head  0.012*  0.011**  
  (0.007)  (0.004) 
Percentage of illiterate household members  -0.321  0.012 
  (0.477)  (0.339) 
Member of hh has elected position in village  0.224  0.364**  
  (0.213)  (0.129) 
Member of hh is a relative of people with elected positions in village  0.047  0.309 
  (0.277)  (0.218) 
Member of hh is a member in a primary society, or other economic group  0.555**  0.213*   
  (0.198)  (0.119) 
Member of hh is a member in a religious, youth, women or other social 
group  -0.057  0.110 
  (0.164)  (0.108) 
Time spent on agricultural (month)  0.012  0.003 
  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Time spent on non-farm (month)  -0.017  -0.002 
  (0.022)  (0.017) 
Max distance to land (km)  0.010  0.001 
  (0.013)  (0.008) 
Amount of land owned (ha)  0.021  0.019 
  (0.040)  (0.023) 
Whether plant maize  -0.234  0.097 
  (0.257)  (0.167) 
Whether plant coffee  -0.215  0.156 
  (0.210)  (0.146) 
Whether plant beans  -0.123  -0.203 
  (0.203)  (0.134) 
Whether plant bananas  0.278  0.436**  
  (0.199)  (0.154) 
Per adult equivalent household income (1000000Tsh)  0.091  0.002 
  (0.138)  (0.127) 
Value of houses and compound (1000000Tsh)  -0.011*  -0.002 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Belong to Chagga group  0.285  -0.091 
  (0.297)  (0.218) 28 
 
Table A1-2: Results of the probit regressions of being interviewed 
  Interviewed 
in round 2 
Interviewed 
in round 3 
Belong to Pare group  0.238  0.232 
  (0.312)  (0.227) 
Christian  0.085  0.085 
  (0.231)  (0.168) 
Distance to town (km)  -0.005  -0.009*** 
  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Market place in village  0.042  -0.193 
  (0.220)  (0.133) 
Cell phone coverage in village  0.353  -0.304*   
  (0.235)  (0.175) 
Agricultural extension agent in village  0.194  0.419*** 
  (0.211)  (0.122) 
Dispensary, health services in village  -0.480**  -0.128 
  (0.186)  (0.114) 
Constant  0.358  -0.304 
  (0.627)  (0.417) 
R-squared  0.14  0.12 
N. of Obs.  949  949 
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Appendix A2. The determinants of agricultural productivity 
Standard Cobb-Douglas production functions are estimated here based on the data 
from all three survey rounds.  This permits estimation of the marginal productivities of 
fertilizers and seeds (in value). The specification includes the standard input variables: land, 
labor, capital, traditional and modern seeds (in value) and organic and inorganic fertilizer (in 
value). As the effectiveness of fertilizer use is affected by the timely supply of water, they are 
further interacted with the percent of land irrigated. Household demographics and education 
level, land quality, crop portfolio and access to credit were further added as controls affecting 
total factor productivity.  
Table A2-1 shows the estimation results. In the first two columns the log of total crop 
income is used as the dependent variable and in the last two columns the log of maize and 
rice income. Where necessary a small number is added to the log of asset, fertilizer and seed 
variables to enable inclusion of observations with zero values. Given the specification in 
double logs, the estimated coefficients on the input variables can be interpreted as elasticities. 
The other variables serve as control variables. Their coefficients are the marginal 
productivities. Two estimates are reported: the OLS estimate and the household fixed effect, 
which mitigates against omitted variable bias from unobserved household heterogeneity.  
Land, agricultural assets, livestock have a significant effect on crop production. The 
estimates of the elasticity of both traditional and improved seeds are significant, and so are 
the elasticities of inorganic fertilizer, with irrigation increasing the effect of fertilizer on 
maize and rice plots.  Male headed households and better educated households tend to be 
more productive. Especially households planting bananas see their crop income 
systematically increase.  
  Using the results in Table A2-1, the marginal productivity of improved seeds and 
inorganic fertilizer are calculated using the marginal productivities for maize/rice production 30 
 
obtained from the fixed effect estimates. The marginal productivity of improved seeds is 
equal to the exponent of the fitted value in the production function (using column 4)  
multiplied by the coefficient of the variable ―Log (improved seeds +1) in kg‖ and divided by 
the value of ―improved seeds +1‖. The marginal productivity of inorganic fertilizer is equal to 
the exponent of the fitted value in the production function (using column 4), multiplied by the 
summation of the coefficient of the variable ―Log (inorganic fertilizer +1) in kg‖ and the 
multiplication of the coefficient of the variable ―Log (inorganic fertilizer +1) in kg*%land 
irrigated‖ and the variable ―%land irrigated‖, and divided by the value of ―inorganic fertilizer 
+1‖. 
 
Table A2-1:Results of the production function estimation 
  Log (crop income)  Log(maize rice income) 
  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
Log (land owned +0.1) in ha  0.259***  0.250***  0.208***  0.207*** 
  (0.050)  (0.070)  (0.047)  (0.060) 
Log (adult  equivalent)  0.026  -0.005  0.065  0.070 
  (0.071)  (0.141)  (0.078)  (0.143) 
Log (agr assets +1) in 1000Tsh  0.050**  0.012  0.034*  0.008 
  (0.019)  (0.032)  (0.019)  (0.034) 
Log (livestock +1) in 1000Tsh  0.105***  0.119***  0.047**  0.059**  
  (0.018)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.025) 
Log (traditional seeds +1) in kg  0.168***  0.168***  0.170***  0.160*** 
  (0.027)  (0.034)  (0.030)  (0.037) 
Log (improved seeds +1) in kg  0.147***  0.077*  0.200***  0.117**  
  (0.032)  (0.044)  (0.038)  (0.049) 
Log (organic fertilizer +1) in kg  -0.026**  -0.007  -0.009  0.012 
  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Log (organic fertilizer +1) in kg*%land 
irrigated 
0.050**  0.015  0.032  -0.009 
(0.020)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.028) 
Log (inorganic fertilizer +1) in kg  0.064**  0.071**  0.160***  0.107**  
  (0.025)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.034) 
Log (inorganic fertilizer +1) in kg*%land 
irrigated 
0.012  -0.007  0.060  0.132**  
(0.049)  (0.054)  (0.060)  (0.065) 
Gender of household head  0.136  0.350**  0.154  0.393**  
  (0.100)  (0.173)  (0.106)  (0.186) 
Education of household head  0.030**  0.017  0.042**  0.016 
  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.013)  (0.023) 
Percentage of illiterate household 
members 
-0.179  -0.467  0.066  0.292 
(0.246)  (0.375)  (0.221)  (0.368) 
Age of household head  0.002  0.006  -0.003  0.000 
  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.005) 
Dependency ratio  -0.032  0.193  -0.027  0.065 
  (0.135)  (0.194)  (0.144)  (0.197) 
Whether plant maize  0.007  0.122  0.957***  0.904*** 
  (0.087)  (0.104)  (0.100)  (0.119) 
Whether plant rice  1.505***  0.483  2.439***  1.308 
  (0.338)  (0.668)  (0.365)  (0.822) 31 
 
Table A2-1:Results of the production function estimation 
  Log (crop income)  Log(maize rice income) 
  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
Whether plant beans  0.235**  0.255**  0.275**  0.258**  
  (0.074)  (0.087)  (0.092)  (0.102) 
Whether plant coffee  0.081  -0.180  -0.368***  -0.548*** 
  (0.089)  (0.127)  (0.097)  (0.136) 
Whether plant banana  0.706***  0.599***  0.048  0.018 
  (0.108)  (0.151)  (0.114)  (0.142) 
Belong to SACCO  0.120  0.167  -0.040  0.030 
  (0.103)  (0.122)  (0.116)  (0.138) 
Has a bank account  0.121  -0.029  0.125  -0.060 
  (0.104)  (0.141)  (0.117)  (0.154) 
Constant  2.324***  2.069***  0.524  1.035**  
  (0.366)  (0.456)  (0.352)  (0.452) 
Time-varying village dummies included         
R-squared  0.418  0.342  0.502  0.413 
F-statistic  9.493  5.845  23.104  12.955 
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Table 1: Political, economic, social, village and program design factors affect input 
voucher distribution.  





No. of obs.  602  18  152 
Political factors       
Member of hh has elected position in village (%)  0.375  0.440  0.575***
(1) 
Member of hh is in village voucher committee (%)  0.037  0.049  0.145*** 
Listen to/read/watch radio, TV, newspaper, internet
(2)  0.817  0.805  0.914*** 
Participate in public meetings, farmer's association, talk to govt officials
(3)  0.492  0.720  0.647*** 
Have the power to make important decisions of life
(4)  0.479  0.422  0.619*** 
Economic factors       
Marginal productivity of improved seeds in 2004 (1000 Tsh/kg)  3.539  1.658  2.358* 
Marginal productivity of inorganic fertilizer in 2004 (1000 Tsh/kg)  4.332  0.634  1.021*** 
Marg. productivity of improved seeds in 2004 (maize &rice) (1000 Tsh/kg)  0.699  0.514  0.472 
Marg. productivity of inorganic fertilizer in 2004 (maize&rice) (1000 Tsh/kg)  0.854  0.665  0.428** 
Whether used improved seed in 2004 (%)  0.499  0.604  0.686*** 
Whether used inorganic fertilizer in 2004 (%)  0.303  0.604  0.559*** 
Total income per adult equivalent in 2004 (1000 Tsh)  119  104  168 
Land cultivated in 2004 (acre)  1.016  1.228  1.251 
Poor in 2004  0.52  0.49  0.38*** 
Social factors       
Gender of household head (1=male)  0.844  0.817  0.891* 
Belongs to Chagga  0.728  0.528  0.841*** 
Belongs to Pare  0.202  0.228  0.081*** 
Christian  0.876  0.592  0.903 
Trust
(5)  0.170  0.114  0.107** 
Village characteristics       
Distance to town (km)  13  17  12 
Whether there is bus to town (%)  0.563  0.285  0.502 
Whether there is market in town (%)  0.292  0.285  0.248 
Whether there is agr input shop in village (%)  0.265  0.046  0.240 
Whether there is extension agent in village (%)  0.872  0.948  0.833 
Program design factors       
Land used for maize/rice in 2004 (acre)  0.333  1.000  1.000 
Crop income/total income   0.284  0.359  0.285 
Whether plant coffee  2009 (%)  0.376  0.357  0.494*** 
Whether planted maize/rice in 2004 (%)  0.551  0.730  0.745*** 
Years of education household head (year)  4.911  3.529  5.088 
Household head is illiterate  0.142  0.042  0.108 
Age of household head  58  56  58 
Belongs to Sacco  0.184  0.206  0.312*** 
Has a bank account  0.138  0.087  0.231** 
Need credit to buy agriculture inputs in 2009  0.135  0.227  0.180*** 
Note.- For the variables of marginal productivities, total income per adult  equivalent, land used for maize and rice, distance 
to town, medians are reported. For all other variables, means are reported. (1) ***, **, * The hypothesis Mean(Not 
eligible)=Mean(Received) is rejected at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. (2) Dummy variable, 1= Listen to/read/watch 
radio, TV, newspaper, internet at least once a month. (3) Dummy variable, 1= Participate in public meetings, farmer's 
association, talk to government officials at least once a month. (4) Dummy variable, 1=Somewhat or mostly able to make 
important decisions of life. (5)Dummy variable, 1=Strongly or somewhat agree that most people can be trusted.  35 
 
 








Coef./S.D.  Coef./S.D. 
Political factors     
Belonging or being associated with local elite     
Member of hh has elected position in village  0.1115**  0.0678*** 
  (0.0398)  (0.0195) 
Member of hh is in village voucher committee  0.2230**                   
  (0.0942)                   
Awareness and empowerment     
Listen to/read/watch radio, TV, newspaper, internet  0.0321  -0.0145 
  (0.0534)  (0.0193) 
Participate in public meetings, farmer's association, talk to government officials 0.1012**  0.0272**  
  (0.0378)  (0.0108) 
Have the power to make important decisions of life  0.0676*  0.0090 
  (0.0373)  (0.0091) 
Economic factors     
Marginal productivity of improved seeds on maize/rice in 2004  0.0065  -0.0021 
  (0.0054)  (0.0037) 
Marginal productivity of inorganic fertilizer  on maize/rice in 2004  0.0078  0.0000 
  (0.0090)  (0.0023) 
Total income per adult equivalent in 2004/1000  0.0228**  0.0011 
  (0.0108)  (0.0009) 
Poor household (1 if yes)  -0.0448  -0.0049 
  (0.0370)  (0.0088) 
Social factors     
Gender household head (1 if male)  -0.0099  0.0216**  
  (0.0568)  (0.0091) 
Age household head  -0.0007  -0.0001 
  (0.0013)  (0.0003) 
Chagga  -0.0348  0.0041 
  (0.1029)  (0.0151) 
Pare  -0.0941  -0.0284**  
  (0.0904)  (0.0102) 
Christian  -0.0980                   
  (0.0850)                   
Trust  -0.0706  0.0106 
  (0.0457)  (0.0159) 
Program design factors     
Land used for maize/rice in 2004  0.0511**  -0.0011 
  (0.0158)  (0.0035) 
Whether planted maize/rice in 2004  -0.0120  -0.0135 
  (0.0462)  (0.0125) 
Whether used improved seed in 2004  0.0496  0.0099 
  (0.0442)  (0.0139) 
Whether used inorganic fertilizer in 2004  0.0615  0.0035 
  (0.0561)  (0.0131) 
Whether plant beans in 2009  0.0788**  0.0047 
  (0.0389)  (0.0100) 








Coef./S.D.  Coef./S.D. 
  (0.0584)  (0.0106) 
Whether plant banana in 2009  -0.0243  -0.0135 
  (0.0511)  (0.0126) 
Years of education household head  -0.0139**  0.0007 
  (0.0064)  (0.0016) 
Household head is illiterate  -0.0492  -0.0130 
  (0.0625)  (0.0129) 
Belong to SACCO  -0.0017  0.0090 
  (0.0479)  (0.0146) 
Has a bank account  0.0860  -0.0031 
  (0.0641)  (0.0109) 
Village dummies  Yes  No 
Pseudo R-squared  0.25  0.22 
N. of Obs.  642  642 
 Note.- Marginal effects are reported, and standard deviations are reported in the brackets. Weights 
calculated in Appendix A1 are used in all regressions. *Denotes significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level 
and *** at 1% level. 37 
 
Table 3: Decentralized targeting does not differ much from uniform distribution of 
vouchers, irrespective of the targeting criterion.  
 
         
Targeting by poverty          
FEI poverty line
(1)  -0.090  -0.055  -0.034  -0.049 
        (0.193) 
Regional median  cons as poverty line  -0.089  -0.051  -0.038  -0.050 
        (0.197) 
Targeting by efficiency         
High marginal prod. seeds
 (2)  0.051  0.051  -0.001  0.062 
        (0.198) 
High marginal prod. fertilizer
(3)  0.024  0.025  -0.002  0.024 
        (0.246) 
Past non users of improved seed  -0.096  -0.055  -0.041  -0.060 
        (0.202) 
Past non-users of fertilizer   -0.191  -0.057  -0.134  -0.055 
        (0.237) 
Note: Means of the variables per village are reported. Standard deviations are reported in the brackets. 
(1) The poverty line is the Food-Energy-Intake poverty line taken from Christiaensen and Pan (2010). 
(2) Households with marginal productivity of improved seeds bigger than the village median are 
defined as productive in using improved seeds. (3) Households with marginal productivity of inorganic 
fertilizer bigger than the village median are defined as productive in using inorganic fertilizer.  
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Table 4: Correlates of decentralized targeting performance 
 
 
min  p10  p25  p50  p75  p90  max 
Political factors 
              # vouchers per village received by sample 
households with elected positions and VVC 
members 
(1) 
0.00  1.06  1.22  2.42  4.34  5.91  9.59 
share of vouchers received by households with 
elected positions and VVC members 
0.00  0.16  0.40  0.60  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Land inequality (Gini index)  0.24  0.32  0.37  0.42  0.49  0.53  0.99 
%Listen to/read/watch radio, TV, newspaper, 
internet
(2) 
0.57  0.71  0.79  0.87  0.92  0.94  1.00 
Social factors               
%with illiterate household head  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.15  0.25  0.42 
%Trust
(3)  0.00  0.06  0.11  0.17  0.21  0.27  0.33 
Program design factors               
# vouchers per village received by sample 
households per village
(1) 
1.02  1.44  2.42  4.68  7.41  9.80  14.9 
Socio-Economic environment               
Agricultural extension agent  0.00  0.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
 
Note:  
(1) corrected for attrition using attrition weights from appendix A1 
(2) Dummy variable, 1= Listen to/read/watch radio, TV, newspaper, internet at least once a month.  




Table 5: Elite capture deteriorates targeting; the poor are better targeted in better covered and more trustworthy settings; extension 
agents favor existing users with lower marginal productivity.  
 
Targeting differential Tv based on following 














New-seed user  New inorganic 
fertilizer user 
Political factors                           
# vouchers captured by households  with elected 
positions and VVC members 
-0.068  ***  -0.078  ***  -0.044  **  0.036    -0.005    -0.063  * 
  (0.020)    (0.022)    (0.019)    (0.043)    (0.030)    (0.035)    
Land inequality (Gini index)  0.226    0.045    0.290  *  -0.370    0.103    0.358    
  (0.327)    (0.407)    (0.166)    (0.232)    (0.272)    (0.300)    
% villagers listening to the radio/watching TV/ 
reading the newspaper/ using the internet at least 
once a month 
0.079    0.326    0.631  **  0.631  *  -0.733  *  -0.780  *** 
  (0.236)    (0.268)    (0.306)    (0.379)    (0.421)    (0.282)    
Social factors                         
% villagers with illiterate household head  0.209    0.377    1.017  ***  0.351    -0.276    -0.191    
  (0.371)    (0.295)    (0.211)    (0.414)    (0.410)    (0.487)    
% villagers having high level of trust in others  1.030  **  0.855  **                  
  (0.449)    0.421                    
Program design factors                       
# vouchers received per village  0.053  ***  0.048  ***  0.024  **  -0.013    0.009    0.029    
  (0.013)    (0.013)    (0.012)    (0.022)    (0.017)    (0.023)    
Socio-economic environment                     
Agricultural extension agent present in village  -0.119    -0.175    0.011    -0.203  ***  -0.203  ***  -0.102  * 
  (0.241)    (0.219)    (0.099)    (0.066)    (0.059)    (0.061)    
_cons  -0.397    -0.403    -0.744  ***  -0.210    0.715  **  0.589  ** 
  (0.375)    (0.372)    (0.262)    (0.300)    (0.339)    (0.260)    
N  37    37    37    37    36
(3)    32
(3)    
F  4.069    4.909    8.968    2.388    8.254    5.339    
Note: Standard deviations are reported in the brackets.*Denotes significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level, *** at 1% level. Weights calculated in Appendix A1 are aggregated at 
the village level and used in all regressions. (1) Poverty line taken from Christiaensen and Pan (2010); (2) poverty line = regional median consumption per adult equivalent. (3) 
The sample size is smaller because some villages had no users of improved seeds and inorganic fertilizer in 2004 and the targeting differentials are not defined for these villages.40 
 
Table 6: The more unequal land is distributed and the further away from a town the 
village is, the larger is the elite capture of the vouchers.   
 
Tobit estimates  # vouchers per village 
captured by elected 
officials or VVC members 
Political factors      
Land inequality (Gini index)  2.409  ** 
  (1.024)   
% villagers listening to the radio/watching TV/ reading the 
newspaper/ using the internet at least once a month 
1.145   
  (2.399)   
Social factors     
% villagers with illiterate household head  -0.229   
  (1.618)   
% villagers having high level of trust in others  -3.189   
  (2.728)   
Program design factors   
# vouchers received per village  0.405  *** 
  (0.080)   
Socio-economic environment     
Agricultural extension agent present in village  -0.073   
  (0.493)   
Distance to nearest town (km)  0.050  *** 
  (0.018)   
Constant  -1.523   
  (2.085)   
N  37   
F  13.84   
Note: Tobit estimates. Standard deviations are reported in the brackets.*Denotes significance at 10% level; ** at 
5% level, *** at 1% level.  